After two devastating earthquakes in Turkey, Greece was one of the first countries to provide aid. Recently, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias visited Turkey. Dendias landed in Adana and was welcomed by his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

In the aftermath of the tragedy, the two countries took refuge in the memory of solidarity in times of disaster. In 1999, following the successive earthquakes in the two countries, a “quake diplomacy” was established under the leadership of then foreign ministers İsmail Cem and Giorgos Papandreou.

In the aftermath of the disaster, the international community’s “inspiring” response, messages of “unity” and support ranging from search and rescue to humanitarian aid gave the impression that Turkey’s “troubled” relations could be mended.

From this point of view, it seems that the “optimistic” mood in times of disaster and destruction has shattered the “pessimism” of a short while ago.

However, within the framework of the principle of “pessimism of the mind, optimism of the will”, the difficulties of turning this optimistic mood into a permanent situation come to the fore. In this analysis, we will try to address these challenges in the triangle of the US, Greece and Sweden.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Germany on February 16th to discuss a wide range of issues, including the coordination of aid in the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes. After Germany, Blinken is expected to visit Turkey on February 19 and Greece on February 21.

The main focus of Blinken’s visit to Athens will be the fourth round of the “US-Greece Strategic Dialogue”.

Blinken last led a strategic dialogue in October 2021, when he renewed the US-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement at the US State Department.

Almost simultaneously with Blinken, Greece is also hosting Chinese Vice Premier Sun Chunlan.

Greek public opinion attributes the simultaneous high-level visits from the two superpowers to “Greece’s growing geopolitical importance”.

Indeed, during the pandemic, the Greek port of Piraeus became an important stopover for Chinese trade. The latest development in this regard was the Strategic Cooperation Agreement on Transport Finance signed between China and Greece. It is expected that the two countries will strengthen their cooperation, especially in the financial context.

As far as the US is concerned, Greece has gained a more important position than Turkey.

Greece is also seeking F-35 jets from the US in the context of the program from which Turkey was excluded. While some analysts point out that the outcome of the proposed sale of modernized F-16s to Ankara and next-generation F-35s to Athens will affect the air defense capabilities of the two neighbors and the balance of power in the region, it is difficult for Turkey to even procure modernized F-16s.

As we reported in our previous analysis, while Greece has started to receive 5th generation F-35s and French Rafale fighters, Turkey is having difficulties in obtaining the Viper version of the 4th generation F-16s. Not long before the earthquake, a group of US senators urged Biden to make the sale of the Viper version contingent on Sweden and Finland’s approval to join NATO.

Of course, all these differences seem to have been overtaken by the magnitude of the disaster and the “deep empathy” coming from Greece, both at the social and political level.

Whatever the political disagreements, the two neighbors give the impression of a geographical “unity of destiny”.

Dendias and Cavusoglu made statements that emphasized this “unity of destiny” in a way to be identified with Papandreou and Ismail Cem.

But the nature of the relationship between Turkey and Greece in 1999 was of a different nature than it is today. Ronald Meinardus explains it this way:

“A quarter of a century later, bilateral relations are in long-term crisis. First and foremost – and this may be the crucial difference – today’s Turkey is not the country it was in 1999. Under Erdogan, the distance between Turkey and Europe (and the West as a whole) has gradually grown. Turkey is by no means the only player responsible for this development”.

The most important point Meinardus draws attention to is that the foundations of the “earthquake diplomacy” that developed between the two countries at that time were laid before the disasters. This meant that there was already a background will to improve relations. The disasters only helped this will to emerge more strongly.

The second point is that the distance between Turkey under Erdoğan and the West has grown “each time”. Indeed, the most important indicator of this “distance” is the West’s perception of Turkey as a country “vulnerable to Russian influence” in its administrative, military and economic dimensions.

In 1999, neither Turkey nor the West acted in such an intense “opposition” to each other, which remained stable for a long time.

In this context, Meinardus fails to mention that in the 1990s, the military balance between Turkey and Greece was not intended to be disturbed in favor of Greece. Today, we are witnessing that this balance has been disturbed for a long time, especially in the case of the F-35s.

Another characteristic of the 1990s was the US effort to keep an “equal distance” from both countries. Today we are witnessing this concern for “equality” crumbling. From the point of view of the US and Greece, this is attributed to Turkey’s “unpredictability”, and the S-400s purchased from Russia is the “concrete” starting point of this unpredictability for the West.

The latest example of the destruction of this inequality is the title of a forum organized by Greek organizations on February 11: ” Marriage with Greece, divorce with Turkey?”. The US strategic investments in Greece are making this possibility stronger and stronger.

Against this backdrop, the question “How possible is a repeat of 1999 in foreign policy?” comes to the fore.

The positions in both domestic and foreign policy that were “ossified” before the earthquake show that a possible “repetition” would require its own “difference”. In other words, in order to repeat 1999, a Western-oriented political will must first emerge in Turkey.

This will must first of all have the power to destroy the image of Turkey as an “unpredictable country” in the West. In the 1990s, Turkey did not have such a problem when it came to the West.

How this will manifest itself depends on the “institutionalization” of relations with the West in particular and foreign policy actions in the broader perspective. This means that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is positioned at the forefront as the main holder of this quality for the sake of foreign policy coherence.

In a broader perspective, the following needs to be said: An AK Party and institutional overhaul under President Erdoğan’s leadership is imperative for a diplomatic recovery that would repeat 1999.

This seems to be an essential course of action that will positively affect Erdoğan’s image in the West and Turkey’s positioning as an “unpredictable country”.

If the devastating catastrophe provides an opportunity to mend problematic relations in foreign policy, as in 1999, it will only be possible if these earthquakes are seen as a domestic political opportunity to focus on the AK Party and institutional revision.

The will that existed in 1999 before the earthquakes must be expressed today after the earthquakes.

The Turkish version of this analysis was published on masastratejiler.com on February 19, 2023.